This post, in response to
waybread, isn't in retrospect as focussed as I'd like. For one who is interested in and desirous of astrology's further development, an awareness of how other fields have emerged and developed seems not irrelevant, although I didn't close the loop very well:
waybread wrote:Hi Spock. I think a real problem for historians of science is in setting boundaries for what is "in" and what is "out." Scholars' understandings of the natural world in the past, for example, were oftentimes very different. One of my regrets (as a former grad student in environmental science) is that the whole field of natural history disappeared. It was the science of its day, but not the science of our day.
Thomas Kuhn, preeminent both as philosopher (
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) and historian of science, has addressed two aspects of this question. He juxtaposes his view of scientific development with that of Sir Karl Popper in "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (also in
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, a collection of Kuhn's papers), and as part of that comparison contrasts their demarcation criteria for determining what is and isn't science. In doing so Kuhn uses astrology, "Sir Karl's most frequently cited example of a 'pseudo-science'", as a test case. Although he ultimately doesn't see astrology as the sort of thing that
could be possible, because he like most scientists and intellectuals basically takes astrologers' word for what astrology
is, he's not really hostile to it and in
The Copernican Revolution emphasizes the role it played in antiquity in the development of astronomy, and the fact that the two were not readily distinguishable at that time. He feels his demarcation criterion is superior to Sir Karl's in explaining why astrology is not now a science, although I see a lot of merit in both of their approaches. But mostly what I got out of a close reading of that part of the article was some ideas about where we are as a discipline and what we need to do to advance it. I recommend the article but will say no more because it's not as germane to the present discussion as the following.
In several papers in
The Essential Tension Kuhn discusses relations between different sciences as well as relations between science and other enterprises, including both technology and art. This material is the primary source of my view that science and technology are separate enterprises, even at the present time, and more obviously during the 19th, 18th and preceding centuries. In "History and the History of Science" he writes, "Science, when it affects socioeconomic development at all, does so through technology. Historians tend frequently to conflate the two enterprises, abetted by prefaces which, since the seventeenth century, have regularly proclaimed the utility of science and have often then illustrated it with explanations of existing machines and modes of production." He notes that despite claims by Bacon and his successors "technology flourished without significant substantive inputs from the sciences until about one hundred years ago." (The article was published in 1971.)
After a discussion of the history of science and technology, emphasizing that the two have rarely flourished at the same time at the same place, he notes three ways in which the two enterprises, "now seen as distinct," have interacted. The oldest and longest lasting, "probably now finished except in the social sciences," is the effect of technology on the sciences: "In all these cases...the resulting benefits have accrued to science not to technology...." The second mode, dating from the mid-18th century, involves practical enterprises, like stock breeding and farming, trying to use scientific methods: "The men who used them were seldom, however, contributors to contemporary science which, in any case, few of them knew." He then turns to the third and most recent mode of interaction: "If one looks for important new processes which result from the development of scientific knowledge, one must wait for the maturation of organic chemistry, current electricity, and thermodynamics during the generations from 1840 to 1870....Since its emergence in the organic dye industry a century ago [this mode of interaction] has transformed communication, the generation and distribution of power (twice), the materials both of industry and of everyday life, and also both medicine and warfare." He notes how difficult this transformation has been to see, asserting that "Most general histories disguise even the existence of any such transformation."
You've undoubtedly noted the relevance to Tesla of the references to current electricity and the generation and distribution of power. With that in mind I turn now to another paper, "The Essential Tension." In this paper Kuhn discusses educational practices and the different personalities of scientists and inventors. Near the end he writes, "One could at least argue that Edison's personality, ideal for the inventor and perhaps also for the 'oddball' in applied science, barred him from fundamental achievements in the basic sciences. He himself expressed great scorn for scientists and thought of them as wooly-headed people to be hired when needed. But this did not prevent his occasionally arriving at the most sweeping and irresponsible theories of his own. (The pattern recurs in the early history of electrical technology: both Tesla and Gramme advanced absurd cosmic schemes that they thought deserved to replace the current scientific knowledge of their day.) Episodes like this reinforce the impression that the personality requisites of the pure scientist and of the inventor may be quite different, perhaps with those of the applied scientist lying somewhere between."
Until I started writing this I didn't remember the reference to Tesla. I remembered and associated the phrase "absurd cosmic schemes..." with Edison but felt it applied to Tesla also! No doubt some readers of this post will insist that Tesla's ideas really
should have superseded the scientific knowledge of his day, that he was as neglected as a scientist as he was, for awhile, as an inventor. I can only say that whether or not it should have the fact is it
didn't, and point out also that science, unlike invention, is a result of consensus, that science itself (pace Kuhn) is the product of a certain kind of group, that there is no omnipotent referee saying, this theory is right and that one is wrong. It's the relevant community, with a shared mentality inculcated by exposure to the same paradigms (i.e., accepted problem solutions) that, acknowledged by the wider society as the authorities in that area, decides what's 'true'.
But my point is not ultimately to prove that Tesla was or was not a scientist, although I still think he wasn't. Rather, I want to suggest on the one hand how surprisingly hard it is to cross boundaries, and on the other hand that it's not impossible and for the sake of our own discipline important to try. In "Mathematical versus Experimental Traditions in the Development of Physicial Science," also in
Tension, Kuhn suggests that history of science can best be approached not by treating the sciences as one, or as unrelated, separate fields, but as natural clusters. He also insists, a point you will undoubtedly appreciate, that when dealing with science during a given period one should deal with the fields and subdivisions as they existed during that period. The histories found at the beginning of science textbooks take the present lineup of fields as a given and indicate when each piece of knowledge was added to the field,
even though the field as presently constituted might not have existed during much of the period when knowledge was supposedly being added piecemeal to it. He calls this Whig history and considers it to be profoundly unhistorical.
Beginning with the 17th century Kuhn describes two sets of fields, a classical cluster, highly developed in antiquity, consisting of mathematics, harmonics, astronomy, geometrical optics, and statics, including hydrostatics. Local motion, thanks to 14th century scholastic analysis, was by the 17th century also a part of this cluster. During the 17th century all of these fields except harmonics were radically reconstructed. The latter, which can roughly be understood as music theory, declined greatly between 1500 and 1800 and dropped out of the sciences. A second natural cluster, the Baconian sciences, consisting of fields such as magnetism, electricity, heat, and chemistry, came into existence around the middle of the 17th century.
These two sets of fields were distinct. Within each cluster practioners moved consequentially from one field to another, but only Newton was unequivocally immersed in both, and his involvement led to two distinct lines of development, one descending from
Principia, the other from
Opticks. The classical sciences were highly developed in antiquity because the data on which they depended lay readily to hand (or up in the sky, dots of light against a black background). These sciences were all mathematical or quasi-mathematical, being largely deductive in their reasoning style. The Baconians, in contrast, disliked math and decried theory. Their emphasis was discovering data via experiment, the idea being that
eventually the accumulation of facts might lead to theories.
During the rest of the 17th century and throughout the 18th the two sets of fields continued to be distinct and flourished in different national settings, the Baconian sciences in England and the low countries, the classical in France. By the latter part of the 18th century the Baconian fields had matured to the point of developing powerful qualitative theories, and during the first quarter of the 19th century, in the French
Ecole polytechnique, in which the practitioners of the two clusters were for the first time brought cheek to jowel, a burst of mathematization occurred in which all the Baconian fields acquired fully mathematical theories. Only then, when the barriers between the two clusters were lowered, did physics, an amalgamation of parts of the two clusters, begin to emerge as one of the current lineup of sciences.
The point of all this is that the barriers between the two sets of fields, and the different mentalities that constituted them, didn't disappear but were displaced to the interior of physics itself. Kuhn points out that theoretical and experimental physics are so different that "almost no one can hope to achieve eminence in both." Yet for a discipline as powerful as modern physics to flourish descendents of the Baconian tradition, the experimentalists, and descendents of the classical tradition, the theorists, must be able to interact constructively. Theorists must be able to appreciate experiment and communicate with experimentalists, experimentalists must be able to appreciate theory and communicate with theorists. This has implications for astrology, which I'll take up below in response to your last paragraph. One other interesting point Kuhn raises. Music, in the form of harmonics, was part of the classical cluster, and mathematicians and
theoretical physicists (but not experimental physicists) are often passionately interested in music and have difficulty in choosing between a musical or scientific career.
During the 19th century natural history and taxonomy/systematics generated all kinds of interest among amateur biologists. There was a huge collecting phase in Britain, for instance, where amateurs added significantly to the known flora and fauna. In a field like taxonomy (and where the universities were humanities-oriented) amateurs could actually make lasting contributions.
I think one thing that helps to determine a field or set of related fields is what the members characteristically
do. I would say natural historians like to tramp about fields and collect samples of things, whether flora, fauna, or rocks. Darwin is a prime example. Martin J.S. Rudwick's
The Great Devonian Controversy, about a transition in geology that took place from about 1834 to 1842, brilliantly evokes the social makeup of the geological and natural history communities and the messy, confusing process of knowledge making, including wrong turns, cul de sacs, power plays and declining and advancing reputations. It's history of science at its best.
I can kind of put inventors like Tesla in their category, because the boundaries of science/not science were more fluid then.
I see your point but am reluctant to go along with it. By the latter part of the 19th century the physics community wasn't that permeable and wasn't peopled by amateurs and/or didn't include them as "collectors" like 20th century (and 21st century?) astronomy. At least that's my impression.
Similarly, I once knew a respected and well-published biologist who switched university departments (highly unusual) because he was an ecologist in the midst of microbiologists and biochemists, who increasingly looked down upon his "soft" research. (A lot of this shift, IMO, has to do with funding from granting agencies.)
What departments did he switch from and to?
Today neither "hard" or natural scientists or political scientists would likely consider Poli Sci to be a true science, despite the "science" term applied to it back-when. This was part of the modernist project around the turn of the last century. Some political scientists are actually more in the humanities camp than in the present-day social sciences.
I vaguely remember hearing or reading about this but don't know much. I know more about a similar split in anthropology between scientific and humanities wings, both virulently hostile to each other. I was briefly involved peripherally when I was on an anthropology mail list and a scandal broke out when a member of the humanities wing wrote a book attacking Napoleon Chagnon, best known for his ethnographic field work among the Yanomamo. I mentioned an exchange I had with someone, perhaps the author, regarding the controversy, and Chagnon asked me for a copy. He was an aggressive, in some ways irritating person, but I thought the other guy was a snake in the grass.
There is a case to be made for labeling as science branches of psychology better termed behavioural science and even neuroscience.
I'm not clear on what you're saying here. Behavioural science and neuroscience
are labeled as science, in their very names, but that's obvious so I think I must not be picking up on your point. I think all branches of psychology are science, albeit not necessarily at the same level. Kuhn makes a clear distinction, which not all of his readers pick up on, between science and mature science, with the latter being what he's describing in his theory of science in
Structure.
And this is part of the problem for astrology. From my perspective, it was so much part-and-parcel of astronomy prior to the Copernican Revolution. Yet today, too many (not all) science historians write it out of their tradition, except perhaps to disparage it. Why? Because it is so clearly not science today.
Kuhn is an interesting case in point. He's relatively enlightened about astrology, and doesn't neglect its role in the evolution of astronomy in
The Copernican Revolution. Thus he writes, "Particularly after Aristotle supplied a physical mechanism ? the frictional drive ? through which heavenly bodies could produce terrestrial change, there was a plausible basis for the belief that an ability to predict the future configurations of the heavens would enable men to foretell the future of men and nations....Before the second century B.C., ancient records show few signs of a fully developed attempt to predict the details of terrestrial affairs from the observed and computed positions of the stars and planets. But after this relatively late start, astrology was inseparably linked to astronomy for 1800 years; together they consituted a single professional pursuit." He goes on to differentiate between judicial astrology and natural astrology, the latter being what we now call astronomy, and notes that Ptolemy was equally famous in both. It's all the more puzzling that he doesn't include astrology in the classical fields. He could have noted that, like harmonics, it declined greatly and fell out of the classical cluster. Astrology's decline was even more precipitous than that of harmonics, being still practiced by Kepler who died in 1630 but effectively banished from astronomy by 1700 if not before.
Given the example of how parts of the classical and Baconian clusters combined to form modern physics, and examples of combination or recombination that can be culled from other fields, for instance molecular biology and, more recently, earth science, it's worth wondering what might be in our own future. Astrology, although it shares the mathematical impetus of the classical cluster, is no longer and likely will never be part of the physical sciences. But it seems to me that, if I'm right that what astrology predicts and therefore is about is
motivational rhythms, then a truly modern astrology might well embody parts of not only traditional astrology, most specifically transit analysis, but also psychology, especially developmental psychology, biology, especially chronobiology, and statistics.
That brings me to my final and ultimate point. I don't quite see the point of the mouse versus elephant analogy, since we should be less concerned about what the elephant thinks of us than about what
we can do to best make sense of that facet of reality with which we're concerned. However, I think that while communication across domains is surprisingly difficult ? I know scientists whose reasoning as geologists or chemists is far more advanced than their reasoning as astrologers ? it's not impossible. Economically backward countries have modernized more rapidly than did England and Western Europe. The less advanced must be able to learn
some lessons from the more advanced, and I can't help thinking it's true of knowledge fields as well. That's why the antiscientism that is so rife on this board ? even on the Philosophy & Science subforum! ? is unfortunate, because I think there are useful lessons to be learned but we'll have a hard time learning them if we're blindly prejudiced against 'science'.